End-user certificate (EUC)

An end-user certificate (EUC), also written end-use certificate, is a signed document used in the international arms trade in which the final recipient of a weapons shipment certifies who will use the goods, where, and for what purpose, and commits not to re-export or transfer them without the exporting government's prior approval. Exporting states require an EUC before licensing a transfer; it is the paper control meant to keep weapons from being diverted to embargoed destinations, sanctioned parties, or armed groups.

The same phrase is used for several unrelated documents, which causes confusion. This page covers the arms-trade meaning. It is not the US procurement certificate under DFARS 225.802-71 (which the US government signs when it buys from foreign governments), not the US Department of Agriculture's wheat end-use certificate program, and not a software end-user license.

Who signs an end-user certificate, and what does it promise?

The foreign end user signs, typically the importing government's ministry of defense or armed forces, and the importing government usually authenticates the certificate with an official stamp or seal. A complete EUC identifies the exporter and end user, describes the items and quantities, states the end use, and contains a non-re-export undertaking. The OSCE publishes a model template for small arms transfers, and SIPRI's research on EUC standards documents what strong certificates contain and how weak, non-standardized formats invite forgery.

What is a DSP-83? What is a BIS-711?

These are the two named US end-use forms. The DSP-83 Nontransfer and Use Certificate is required under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR 123.10) for permanent exports of significant military equipment and classified defense articles; the foreign consignee and end user certify they will not re-export, resell, or otherwise dispose of the articles without prior written State Department approval. The BIS-711 Statement by Ultimate Consignee and Purchaser is the counterpart under the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR 748.11) for controlled items licensed by the Commerce Department. In one sentence: the State Department licenses items on the Munitions List under ITAR, while the Commerce Department licenses dual-use goods under the EAR.

How does the US government check where its weapons end up?

Through two post-shipment programs: Blue Lantern at the State Department for commercial exports, and Golden Sentry at the Defense Department for government-to-government Foreign Military Sales. The checks reach a small fraction of licensed transfers, and they verify custody and inventory, not how the weapons are used. The programs, the numbers, and where they break down are covered on the end-use monitoring page.

Do end-user certificates actually prevent diversion?

They help at the licensing stage, but a certificate is a promise on paper, and the documented record shows how the promise breaks. UN investigators found that arms trafficker Leonid Minin moved 68 tonnes of weapons from Ukraine to Liberia and Sierra Leone's RUF in 1999 using a forged certificate naming Burkina Faso, and that roughly 14 million dollars in Bulgarian weapons were exported against 18 forged Togolese certificates in the late 1990s, with transport linked to Viktor Bout's network. The UN's Angola sanctions panel found governments willingly lent their certificates so embargoed buyers could purchase arms legally on paper. GAO reviews have repeatedly found implementation gaps in US end-use monitoring, and the programs verify inventory and custody, not how weapons are actually used.

What end-use assurances does Israel give for US weapons?

Written assurances under National Security Memorandum 20 (February 2024) that US weapons would be used in accordance with international humanitarian law. The State Department judged those assurances "credible and reliable" in May 2024, even while assessing that US weapons had likely been used in ways inconsistent with those obligations, and transfers continued. In December 2025 the Pentagon's own Inspector General found that DoD could properly account for less than half of the US defense articles under enhanced monitoring in Israel; the full record, from the assurances to the DODIG-2026-033 audit numbers, is on the end-use monitoring in Israel page.

What do end-user certificates have to do with ports and airports?

The end-use paperwork travels with the freight. Controlled exports require Electronic Export Information filed in the Automated Export System, tying the license to the physical consignment, and the invoice must carry a Destination Control Statement saying the items may not be resold or diverted from the named end user. Under 15 CFR 758.3, every party in the chain carries responsibility, and a freight forwarder acting as agent does not escape it. That is why the region's cargo chokepoints, like JFK Airport's freight terminals, are where the paper trail and the physical supply chain meet.

Are end-user certificates required internationally?

The Arms Trade Treaty requires importing states to provide end-use or end-user documentation to assist the exporter's risk assessment (Article 8) and obligates parties to prevent diversion (Article 11). The EU's Common Position on arms exports makes diversion risk a licensing criterion, and a 2021 Council decision set common minimum elements for EUCs in small-arms exports. The Wassenaar Arrangement's participating states exchange practices on end-user assurances.

Also known as: EUC, end-use certificate

Last reviewed August 13, 2026.

Cite this page: Break the Chain (NYC-DSA Anti-War Working Group), "End-user certificate (EUC)," Arms-Trade and Logistics Glossary. https://wecanbreakthechain.com/glossary/end-user-certificate/